Loss mitigation is the process by which lenders attempt to minimize losses associated with foreclosure. As competition increases in the mortgage industry, lenders and servicers are under great pressure to adopt loss mitigation tactics rather than simply use foreclosure as the means of dealing with borrowers in default. This study presents a mortgage-pricing model that fully speci®es all borrower options with respect to default, including the ability to reinstate the mortgage out of default. We document the impact of various loss mitigation programs, including forbearance and antide®ciency judgments, as well as the value of credit on borrower default behavior.
Introduction
Competition in the servicing industry and the resulting squeeze on pro®t margins is spurring the development of new sources of operating ef®ciencies. As a result, the mortgage industry is rapidly developing loss-mitigation systems designed to allow mortgage servicers to identify and manage delinquent borrowers who have the greatest risk of going to foreclosure. For example, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have developed automated mortgage scoring models designed to identify borrowers with the greatest likelihood of going into default. In addition, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rates mortgage servicers based on their default losses and loss-mitigation successes, giving incentives for servicers to actively engage in reducing default losses. Utilizing these models, it is hoped that mortgage servicers will reduce the losses associated with borrower default. However, a major concern with implementing loss-mitigation programs is the agency problem associated with signaling a reduction in the costs associated with default. The concern is that as loss mitigation becomes more prevalent, borrowers may internalize the lower default costs and, in turn, increase the incidence of default. Part of this concern arises from the lack of information about the impact of loss-mitigation programs on borrower behavior. For example, it is unclear whether offering default forbearance (in the form of delaying foreclosure) will increase borrower reinstatement rates. This study ®lls this information gap by introducing a mortgage-pricing model, which explicitly incorporates borrower options with respect to default outcome to examine the impact of various loss-mitigation programs. While applied to the mortgage contract, the model has obvious applicability to other common contracts containing path-dependent options.
Mortgage pricing models recognize two explicit options embedded in mortgage contractsÐthe right to default (foreclose) and the right to prepay. These options also contain implicit options to delay default or prepayment. Furthermore, the interaction of these explicit termination options grants an additional implied option to substitute one method of termination with the other. Traditional pricing models provide valuable information to lenders concerning the impact of changing underwriting guidelines on borrower exercise of prepayment and default options. These models, however, do not address the ef®cacy of postorigination loss-mitigation programs.
While long recognized by the mortgage industry, academic studies on mortgage pricing have only recently viewed default and foreclosure as separate economic events. In order to eliminate confusion from terminology employed in industry practice and mortgage pricing literature, we follow the practice in the literature (i.e., Kau et al., 1992 ) by de®ning default (or foreclosure) as the lender's act of taking title to the property to satisfy a claim and introduce the term delinquency to represent the nonpayment of the mortgage payment due.
2 Note that we separate the traditional pricing model default option into two components: the right to stop making payments and the right to give up the property via foreclosure. Traditional pricing models combine these components into the term default. This contrasts with the industry terminology where default refers to the borrower nonpayment of the payment due and foreclosure is the act of taking the property. While this may appear to be an issue with timing and semantics, it focuses on an important feature overlooked in previous pricing models: the right to reinstate the mortgage prior to foreclosure by bringing the payments current. The model developed in this article explicitly segments default into its component parts and analyzes them independently.
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The relationship between property value and mortgage default is the backbone of modern mortgage pricing models. Recognizing this link, lenders attempt to limit future default (foreclosure) with optimal loan-to-value (LTV) ratios so that borrowers also risk a portion of their wealth. This ensures that the borrower suffers ®rst loss in any property value decline, providing the lender with a cushion against default. As expected, studies show that increasing the borrower's wealth at risk (via low LTV ratios) decreases the probability of default (foreclosure).
